Defence Sector Intelligence & Due Diligence

Background

A client operating in the defence sector requested verification of several companies under consideration for collaboration on a joint project. Given the sensitive nature of the project and its strategic importance, any partner with legal, ethical, or security red flags had to be identified before engagement.

What We Did

We analysed the background of each candidate company using military-grade OSINT methods, reviewing corporate histories, litigation records, regulatory filings, and law enforcement databases. Special attention was paid to indicators of dealings with sanctioned or occupied territories.

Key Findings

• Court records related to one of the candidate companies revealed that law enforcement had conducted searches at the company's production facility. The searches were carried out on suspicion of commercial activity involving enterprises located in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
• The existence of an active criminal investigation indicated not only potential legal liability but also a broader pattern of disregard for wartime compliance obligations.

Outcome

The client declined to partner with the flagged company. Engaging with an entity under active criminal suspicion would havecreated legal exposure and posed an unacceptable risk to the integrity of the joint defence project.

Background

A Ukrainian defence procurement intermediary (sourcing components for domestic weapons systems) commissioned an investigation into one of its established suppliers ahead of contract renewal. Internally, the supplier had a clean track record, but informal signals from the market prompted a closer look.

What We Did

We conducted a supply chain intelligence review combining corporate ownership analysis, cross-border trade data, and OSINT mapping of the supplier's upstream vendor network. We traced the origin and routing of key components delivered under prior contracts and assessed the legal standing of affiliated entities across multiple jurisdictions.

Key Findings

• The supplier's primary upstream vendor was registered in a Central Asian jurisdiction commonly used as a sanctions bypass corridor, with no verifiable production capacity of its own.
• Component markings and import documentation were inconsistent with declared country of origin, suggesting re-labelling of goods sourced from sanctioned manufacturers.
• Two directors of affiliated logistics entities appeared in Ukrainian court records in connection with customs fraud proceedings unrelated to the current contract.
• One critical component category delivered under a prior contract matched specifications of items subject to dual-use export controls — controls the supplier had not disclosed or sought clearance for.

Outcome

The client suspended the contract renewal andreferred findings to its internal compliance function and relevant authorities.The investigation prevented the procurement of potentially compromised components into a sensitive weapons programme and shielded the client from downstream legal and reputational liability.

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