
2 March 2026
€900 Million and the Cost of Assumptions
A €900M EU real estate deal under investigation shows why institutional reputation cannot replace structured due diligence.

We were able to find all the assets of the person’s family, all those who were involved in criminal and property schemes. We identified nearly a thousand law firms belonging to this family, found all undeclared property – land plots, houses, cars – and estimated its value. We also found negative facts, including ties to Russia and criminal cases of "raiding" and physical assault. We tracked the "political path" of the participants, including corruption and money laundering. We established the facts of "buying memberships" in political parties and illegal use of official powers.
In addition, we, under the guise of journalists and / or stakeholders, developed a legend and made dozens of phone calls under its pretenses. Social engineering was needed to establish the positions and relationships of those involved in the case to each other and other related people. Also, thanks to direct contact, we were able to interview the victims of their activities, and realistically assess the damage caused by that family by comparing the data obtained from different sources.
We’ll tell what we managed to find very briefly. For comfort, we use aliases. The names are arbitrary. Surnames are Latin letters.
As of January 2022, the N. family owned 20 legal entities that traded in wine materials and agricultural products abroad, including in russia, Romania, China, Moldova, Spain, Vietnam and Belarus. During the period from 2014 to 2021, XXX deliveries worth more than $8 million were made, of which > 80% were to russia and amounted to almost $7 million.
In 20XX, Ivan N. ran for the Verkhovna Rada from the Volodymyr Lytvyn People's Bloc, but did not pass because he was on the XXX place in the list. In 20XX he was elected to *confidential information*.
In 20XX he ran for the Nash Krai ("Our Land") party, ran for the Odessa regional council as a deputy of the 20th convocation, and was a member of commissions on *confidential information*.
According to rumors, in 20XX there was a conflict between Ivan N. and the party leader, and due to influence on the prosecutor - N. was expelled from the party Nash Krai ("Our Land") during a session of the regional council.
In 20XX he left the party Nash Krai ("Our Land"), the same year he ran for another political party. Probably, Ivan and his son Ivan Jr. bought memberships in the party.
Real estate: according to declarations and registers, the N. family jointly owns XX land plots with a total area of XXXX m2 in Odessa region, as well as X residential buildings in Odessa region: since 20XX - a house with the area of XXX,X m² in Odessa; since 20XX - a house of XXX,X m² in *confidential information*; since 20XX - a house of XXX, X m² in *confidential information*. The house in Odessa on XXX Street is located in an elite area, the cost of houses in this area is from 400 thousand to one million dollars and above.
Also, legal entities of the N. family own XX objects of real estate and XXXX land plots in the Odessa region in total. The total area of known land assets is XXX km², the total value of assets is over 30 million dollars.
Cars: as of December 20XX, there are no cars registered to the family. However, we know of XXX vehicles registered to legal entities of the N. family, whose total value is more than $4 million. The eight most expensive cars cost more than $1 million in total and were purchased between 20XX and 20XX.
Relations with russia: in the period from 2014 to 2021 legal entities of the N. family made XXX deliveries of wine materials and agricultural products worth more than $ 8million, of which >80% were to russia and were worth almost $7 million.
Lawsuits: A total of XXX known lawsuits were made against the assets of the N. family, of which XX were criminal. Also, of them XX cases were as a debtor before the tax service.
Raids: according to media reports, the N. family raided the Odessa region, pressuring local residents to buy land from small farmers, and using hired strongmen to make them sign away the legal rights of agricultural firms and then replacing managers with their own.
[NAME]: illegally registered an agricultural firm [NAME] with the participation of Oleg Odious, who is part of the city council of [CITY] in Odessa region. People's Deputy Gennady Cunning also took part in the transfer of 60% of the corporate rights of the [NAME] firm to the N. family and Odious. Odious bought XX,X% of [NAME] firm from N. for 5 million hryvnias. As a result of the conflict, Ivan N. sued Odious for the shares and won. In 20XX, Odious accused N. of trying to seize his firms. During a conversation with Odious, the latter stated that the conflict was in the past and declined to comment further. The previous owner of the [NAME] firm declined to comment on the N family.
Participation in physical assault: family members put pressure on the residents of the village of XXX in order to raid an agricultural company. They may also be involved in the beating of a person who later died. During the conversation with the participants of the case, statements were received that there were no attempts of raider capture by N., and a number of participants refused to comment on N.;
Confirmed raid by N.: they used "legal pressure" together with [NAME], who in 20XX was accused of large scale embezzlement. Also in 20XX, [NAME] was a suspect in the case of destruction of the XXX plant, together with a former People's Deputy from the political party “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland), who is also involved in raids in Odessa.
Money laundering: related to reconstruction of the water treatment plant in the village XXX, where there is no sewerage, however there is a company owned by N. In 20XX 400 thousand hryvnias was allocated for the repair of the station, in 20XX – 1 million hryvnias, and from 20XX to 20XX – another 3 million hryvnias.
Declarations: in his financial disclosure declaration for 2018 N. did not specify the value of the purchased property; in July 20XX government announced the verification of the declarations of a number of deputies, including N., since he hadn’t indicated the value of the land owned by him and his wife for the total amount of $XXX,X, nor had he indicated the income from the will.
Purchase of seats in the People's Political Party: According to media reports, N. and his relative N. bought memberships in the People's Political Party through XXX. They are also advisers to XXX and attend official events in the Odessa region with him.
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