Geoint

The Russian Orthodox Church may use its churches in Europe for intelligence activities, strategically constructing them near critical facilities. The first part of the analysis covers Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Czechia.

What have the Russians placed under protective domes on the Western Cape of occupied Crimea? Molfar have analyzed social media, tourist photos, and satellite images of Cape Tarkhankut, further confirming that Russian radar systems are located there.

The article examines the condition of the Crimean Bridge following the attack in July 2023. Analysts from the Molfar agency found that the railway section of the illegally built Crimean Bridge is currently not involved in Russian military logistics. They have identified new strategic crossing routes that are more functional than the damaged railway section of the bridge. These routes pose a significant threat.

To find out who was involved in the destruction of the dam at the Kakhovska HPP, the Molfar team analyzed all the information available on the network. Four theories were under the consideration: the dam broke by itself ("Mother Nature" is to blame); detonation and self-destruction; the Ukrainian military is to blame (although they did not have access to the HPP from the beginning of the full-scale invasion) and the thesis that the Russians blew up the HPP themselves. Let us consider each of them in detail.

The Molfar OSINT community shares a case of identifying military targets that needed to be eliminated in the city of Popasna, Donetsk region. The article describes the algorithm of location search and coordinates security check, and presents the results of the work done in the form of a satellite image. In this article, we also reveal the role of recruited Russian agents in the war and demonstrate the success of cooperation after the end of the agent's ties.

The Molfar OSINT community has developed a unique training material on the use of OSINT and GEOINT techniques to complete the tasks of military intelligence. Locations are searched by analyzing enemy propaganda resources, reports of Russian war correspondents, and social media of Russian military servicemen.